Friday 17 April 2015

Commission issues Statement of Objections to Google: Where next?

The Commission’s failure to secure acceptable commitments from Google in its search engine investigation has further prompted concerns as to the effectiveness of the existing legal tools to curb abuse of dominance in digital markets.  The Commission’s issue of a Statement of Objections to Google on 15 April 2015, however, suggests a new impetus in the investigation. 

The Commission’s investigation into alleged abuse of dominance by Google in relation to its search engine practices dates back to February 2010, when the Commission announced that it had received complaints about Google, including allegations revolving around grants of preferential placement in search results to its own vertical search services.

The Commission announced that it had initiated Article 102 proceedings against Google on 30 November 2010.  Since then the investigation has been very much in the public eye but on successive occasions where a resolution has seemed imminent, this has not materialised.

The Commission consulted on two rounds of commitments from Google and on 5 February 2014, the Commission announced that it had obtained an enhanced proposal that it was minded to accept.  In particular, Google offered a remedy that where it promotes its own services, at least three rivals will be displayed in a “comparable” way, such as by using the same sized photos.  Interestingly, when similar concerns were raised in the US these resulted in more modest concessions being offered to the FTC than those offered by Google in the EU.

In June 2014 Commissioner Almunia said that the investigation was “hopefully coming to an end with the adoption of a decision before the end of my mandate”.  However, in September 2014 this appeared unlikely and Google was asked to offer improvements after feedback from the market test.  Revised objections were raised by third parties including the price comparison site Foundem.  These question, for example, why Google should be able to give greater visibility to paid links.

It is not unusual for the Commission to consult on more than one set of draft commitments.  It has not yet accepted commitments in a case involving four rounds.  Moreover, where the market test reveals that the commitments on offer are insufficient the Commission should be wary of accepting a revised offer without putting it back to the market, unless it was very obvious that the new package addressed the Commission’s concerns.  Given the obvious trade-off between an early resolution and an uncertain legal challenge, it is understandable why the process can be iterative. 

On 15 April 2015, however, the investigation took a rather different turn and the Commission sent Google a Statement of Objections.  The Commission alleges that by favouring its own comparison shopping pages in its general search results this hinders the ability of its rivals to compete.  The Commission alleges that as a result of artificially shifting traffic to its own sites, users do not necessarily see the most relevant results in response to their search queries.

On the same day as issuing its Statement of Objections in the search engine case the Commission announced a formal investigation into Google’s Android operating system.  The Commission has concerns that Google may be unlawfully restricting competitor operating systems and applications. Commissioner Vestager states that: "In recent years, smartphones and tablets have changed the way that consumers access the internet and the way that many companies do business. Mobile internet usage is growing rapidly and there is no reason to think that this will change in the coming years. I want consumers to benefit from the broadest range of mobile services and innovation in the sector".  While the investigation is separate from the search engine case and has been under the Commission’s watch for some months, it confirms sustained momentum in the Commission’s policy focus.

A test of the substantive theory of harm

Much of the debate about the Google case has focused on remedies.  Those issues cannot be divorced from the underlying substantive issues.  Novel and controversial theories of harm have been raised. 

When the Commission set out its preliminary assessment, of most concern was the prominent display, within Google's web search results, of links to Google's specialised web search services (e.g. Google Shopping) relative to links to competing specialised web search services (including services allowing users to search for restaurants, hotels or products).

At first sight it might appear that the preference shown by a dominant company to its own services could be a classic abuse of dominance.  However, on closer inspection this conclusion does not automatically follow.  It may be asked why Google cannot show what it considers to be its own directly responsive results, since that is precisely what a search engine does and is a core value proposition.  Search engines will compete on the basis of their own offering by showing exactly what they consider to be responsive to a user query.  An issue for competition, then, is what Google should or should not be permitted to do in terms of differentiating itself.  Putting it another way: should third parties be entitled to an equal position in Google’s search results?  Even if that is accepted, how is that to be achieved in a way that allows consumers to make an informed choice and without destroying Google’s incentives to innovate?  These are the issues at the heart of the Google case.

Where next in the investigation?

The new commissioner Danish politician Margrethe Vestager may provide the impetus for a change in direction.  Those who expect such a route to be speedier and more definitive may, however, be disappointed.  Should the Commission proceed to a formal finding of infringement, it cannot expect to be immune from challenge given the vigour with which all sides have pursued their case so far.

Google now has to prepare its defence to the Statement of Objections in advance of an oral hearing.  One possible outcome is that the Commission finds an abuse of dominance and imposes a penalty on Google.  However, Vestager’s comments that this is “not the end” seem to suggest that outcome is not inevitable and that there is still the possibility of a consensual remedy.

A key difference between the commitments route and an infringement decision under Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003 is that the Commission will almost certainly impose a penalty in the latter case.  If the Commission issues an infringement decision Google could be fined up to 10 per cent of its worldwide turnover (i.e. up to US$ 6 billion).  The actual level of the fine imposed will be based on a number of factors including the ‘gravity’ or seriousness of the infringement.  The Commission will typically take as a starting point the relevant sales in the market concerned by the infringement.  The highest fine imposed for a breach of EU competition law was on Intel in 2008 and amounted to just over a billion euro.  This was still some way short of 10 per cent of Intel’s 27,972 million euro (US$ 38 834 million) worldwide turnover in 2007.

The Commission’s focus on Google (and Microsoft before it) has prompted the often recurring question as to whether US companies are receiving rather more scrutiny than their European rivals.  However, only a day after issuing the Statement of Objections on her first visit to the USA, Commissioner Vestager has made clear her views that Google is a “good company” and that it makes no difference from the EU competition law perspective whether a company is American or European.

The announcement of a Statement of Objections has been hailed as a win for many complainants, including rival search engines.  However, in law as well as in life there can be an element of ‘be careful what you wish for’.  The commitments offered so far have not appeased complainants but an infringement decision may not give them complete satisfaction either.  This is because a prohibition decision is just that: it will say what is not permitted but it is not so susceptible to prescribing changes to market conduct.

Reference:

Commission press release IP/15/4780 , MEMO/15/4781 and STATEMENT/15/4785

Speech by Margrethe Vestager "Competition policy in the EU: Outlook and recent developments in antitrust", Peterson Institute for International Economics Washington DC, 16 April 2015

 

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